The Treaty of Versailles, signed in 1919 after Germany’s defeat in World War 1, held Germany responsible for the war. It imposed harsh conditions on Germany and forced them to pay war reparations. It took about 13% of Germany’s European territory, with bits of it going to Belgium, Czechoslovakia, Poland and France. It also took away all of German overseas colonies, and limited the size of the German armed forces1.
Some British politicians thought that some of the restrictions from the Treaty were overly harsh. However, in April 1933, the British Ambassador to Germany sent a dispatch to London in which he summarised Hitler’s political treatise and autobiography, Mein Kampf. This report made clear Hitler’s desire to use war and military might to redraw the map of Europe. At the time, the British government was not sure whether to take Hitler’s manifesto seriously, or how to respond to it. Some speculated that his priorities would change as he took on the responsibilities of governing. Notably, Neville Chamberlain believed that the British government could negotiate with Hitler in good faith. Chamberlain hoped that by appeasing Hitler (i.e. agreeing to some of his demands), the Nazis would not resort to war2.
What led to appeasement was a combination of issues. The Great Depression had placed considerable pressure on the economies of Europe, including Britain and France, that led to competing demands on government expenditure. There was also an enormous antiwar sentiment after the disaster of the war. As a consequence, there was a great deal of support for appeasement among the ruling elite in Britain. However, in 1933 then under the rule of Hitler, withdrew from and international disarmament conference. In 1935, the regime announced the expansion of the armed forces, the creation of the Luftwaffe (German Air Force), and the reinstatement of conscription. Britain and France protested, but did little else2.
Also in 1935, Britain signed the Anglo-German Naval Agreement. This allowed Germany to maintain a naval force much larger than they were permitted under the Treaty of Versailles. This was seen by the British as a way of preventing a naval arms race between the two countries2. In 1936, Germany marched into the Rhineland, which had been demilitarized under the Treaty of Versailles. Again Britain and France protested but did little else2. In 1938, Germany annexed Austria (the Anschluss), again a blatant violation of the Treaty of Versailles. Again Britain and France and other nations protested but did little else2.
In the middle of 1938, Germany claimed that German-speakers in the Sudetenland (part of Czechoslovakia) were being oppressed by the Czechoslovakian Government. Hitler threatened war if the Czechoslovaks refused to cede the territory to Germany. This was when Chamberlain got involved. In September, 1938, he flew to Hitler’s vacation home in Berchtesgaden to negotiate the German leader’s terms. Chamberlain’s goal was to reach a diplomatic solution in order to avoid war. At a second meeting, Hitler told Chamberlain that Germany would occupy the Sudetenland by October 1, with or without an international agreement2. On September 29–30, 1938, an international conference took place in Munich. The attendees were Chamberlain, Hitler, French Prime Minister Édouard Daladier, and Italian dictator Mussolini. Despite the Czechoslovak government not being included in the conference, Chamberlain and the others agreed to the cession of the Sudetenland2.
It was on his return from Germany, that Chamberlain waved a piece of paper about while saying: “My good friends, for the second time in our history, a British Prime Minister has returned from Germany bringing peace with honour. I believe it is peace for our time”2.
In exchange for the Sudeten concessions, Hitler renounced any claims to the rest of Czechoslovakia. A year later, Germany invaded Poland and the European part of World War 2 began.
While it is impossible to know if confronting Hitler rather than appeasing him would have prevented a war. However appeasing him certainly led to a war which killed many tens of millions.
After the breakup of the Soviet Union near the end of 1991, Ukraine had a rather large nuclear arsenal on its territory. In return for sending that arsenal back to Russia, at a meeting in Budapest in 1994, Russia, the US and UK all signed the Budapest Memorandum, reaffirming commitments to respect Ukraine’s sovereignty and existing borders and to refrain from the threat or use of force against its territorial integrity or political independence3.
In November 2013, the Ukrainian Government of pro-Russian President Viktor Yanukovych decided not to sign a planned Association Agreement with the European Union and demonstrations ensued in the capital Kyiv. These ‘Euromaidan’ demonstrations turned violent in early 2014 and, in February that year, some European foreign ministers mediated a compromise, involving a unity government and early elections. After the collapse of a power-sharing agreement on 22 February 2014, Yanukovych fled to Russia and a new government was installed by the Ukrainian parliament4.
Russia, like Germany in 1938, maintained that there was supposed oppression of Russian-speakers in eastern Ukraine5. Toward the end of February 2014, Russian troops surrounded the airports in Crimea, a majority-Russian peninsula in Ukraine. The Crimean Autonomous Assembly was then seized by pro-Russian forces. In March 2014 the assembly issued a declaration of independence and a subsequent referendum on union with Russia was held. According to Russian election officials, 95.5% of voters supported union with Russia. Since then, Russia has maintained its control over Crimea and supported pro-Russian separatist forces who also took control of parts of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions of eastern Ukraine (the Donbas) in 2014. Fighting between Russian-supported separatists and Ukrainian government forces continued in the Donbas for the subsequent eight years despite the negotiation of the Minsk Agreements in 2014 and 2015 which called for a ceasefire, the withdrawal of all foreign armed groups and constitutional reform recognising the special status of Donetsk and Luhansk5.
Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 put paid to any negotiations. Putin seemingly expected the invasion to be over very quickly, as his armed forces attacked Ukraine from Russia, Belarus and Crimea. In an address on Russian state television he termed this invasion a ‘special military operation’. Initial intelligence assessments and leaked Russian security service e-mails suggested a timeline of 2-3 days to capture Kyiv and topple the government6. Documents in captured Russian tanks suggested that the broader operation would take up to 10 days. Some soldiers even had their parade uniforms packed for a victory march in Kyiv7.
Putin could not have suspected that almost 5 years later he would be slowly losing the war in Ukraine, with the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine estimating that Russia has suffered 1,599,390 casualties as of November 5, 20268. These casualties are estimated to include as many as 450,000 dead (as of July, 2026)9. The monthly number of casualties is also increasing, with an estimated 54,400 killed or wounded in October 2026, the fourth consecutive month that Russia has suffered over 40,000 monthly casualties10.
Putin has stated that the collapse of the Soviet Union was the ‘greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the century’ and ‘would reverse it if he could’11. However, he has called claims that he wants to restore the Soviet Union ‘complete stupidity’12.
However, he clearly does want to restore a strong Russian sphere of influence, and as part of that, he wanted to turn Ukraine into a client state, much like Belarus; not part of Russia, but with a puppet government, much as it looked like it would be under Yanukovych13.
So, the handing over of parts of Ukraine to Russia under a peace agreement is simply a form of appeasement. If anyone believes that giving part of Ukraine to Putin would prevent a subsequent invasion of the remainder of Ukraine, look what happened 8 years after his 2014 annexation of Crimea. As I have said before, it is imperative that Russia is driven out of Ukraine completely, with its tail between its legs14. If it is not defeated, the nations around it should feel very nervous.
Sources
- https://encyclopedia.ushmm.org/content/en/article/treaty-of-versailles
- https://encyclopedia.ushmm.org/content/en/article/neville-chamberlain
- https://www.hks.harvard.edu/publications/budapest-memorandum-25-between-past-and-future
- https://commonslibrary.parliament.uk/research-briefings/cbp-9476/
- https://constcourt.md/libview.php?l=en&idc=9&id=1045&t=/Media/Publications/
- https://www.businessinsider.com/vladimir-putin-russian-forces-could-take-kyiv-ukraine-two-days-2022-3
- https://www.iwm.org.uk/history/contemporary-conflict/ukraine/how-putin-lost-in-10-days
- https://index.minfin.com.ua/en/russian-invading/casualties/
- https://www.csis.org/analysis/russian-blood-and-treasure-ballooning-costs-putins-war
- https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-1-2026/
- https://www.rferl.org/a/putin-says-would-reverse-collapse-soviet-union-1991-if-could-question-asked-kaliningrad/29076226.html
- https://indianexpress.com/article/world/putin-wants-to-revive-soviet-union-kremlin-complete-stupidity-reaction-10411161/
- https://carnegieendowment.org/russia-eurasia/politika/2024/05/putin-anti-soviet-russia
- https://www.blotreport.com/2023/03/03/the-first-of-two-current-world-wars/