In Russia there have been anti-Putin demonstrations, which occasionally have escalated into ‘riots’, with one leading to people shouting, in unison, ‘Down with the Tsar’, ‘Freedom for political prisoners’ and ‘For fair elections’, the latter in the shadow of the recent sham Duma elections. Of course, these demonstrations have been suppressed, sometimes brutally, with many arrests and subsequent imprisonment of protesters. Criticism of the official narrative regarding the war has been criminalised1,2.
Apart from demonstrations, there are signs of an expanding anti-war and anti-Putin resistance inside Russia. It has manifested itself in two main ways.
Sabotage
Sabotage has become fairly commonplace since the invasion of Ukraine. However, as government crackdowns increased the personal cost of involvement in sabotage, an increasing share of such sabotage has become the handiwork of individual saboteurs or small cells. Enlistment offices were a common target of sabotage (mainly arson), as in the early stages of the war, they relied on paper records. Another target of sabotage attempts has been the rail network. Early on, a Belarusian group, Supratsiu, was involved in targeting rail transport in Belarus. A Russian group called Ostanovi Vagony (Stop the Wagons) was involved with attempts to derail trains. Subsequently they have shifted their focus to relay cabinets and switchboards, which are commonly in isolated areas, making escape easier. More groups have arisen with names such as Liberator, Oblava, Severskiy Kray and Skrepach3.
There is also significant sabotage in the Russian occupied areas of Ukraine. One of the groups involved in this is Atesh, a pro-Ukrainian militia originally from Crimea, that has expanded its area of operations into other occupied areas. Like others, it is mostly about tampering with the rail network and arson, especially against military vehicles3.
Ukrainian special services have also been conducting sabotage operations across Russia, attacking military aircraft, derailing and blowing up trains, blowing up fossil fuel pipelines, and attacking oil tankers in Russian ports3.
Armed Russian opposition
There are a couple of units comprising mostly Russian citizens fighting on the Ukrainian side in the war. These are the Freedom of Russia Legion and the Russian Volunteer Corps, both of which have been in existence since 2022, and their numbers run into the several hundreds in total. The Russian Volunteer Corps is a right-wing conservative organisation, while the Freedom of Russia legion has no dominant ideology, but is united in opposition to Russia’s aggression4.
What could cause this low level opposition to increase, perhaps to an insurgency? Initial mobilisation was part of the increase in arson attacks on enlistment offices. If compulsory recruitment or a substantial expansion of mobilisation is instituted it could provoke further resistance and attacks. Another mutiny like that by the Wagner group, or a split in the security establishment could enable opposition to grow in the cracks. A severe economic or fiscal shock, including falling state revenues, delayed wages, reduced regional funding or falling household living standards (all of which are happening now) could increase the level of anger and lead to opportunities for opposition groups to form.
If coordination between those with economic grievances, anti-war activists, regional separatists, and the many disaffected veterans happens, that could lead to a serious insurgency. It is unsurprising that Putin lives in a bunker; there are no windows to fall out of.
Sources
- https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Ta5_11mAIuw
- https://acleddata.com/report/boiling-under-lid-protest-potential-ahead-russias-2024-presidential-election
- https://acleddata.com/report/behind-lines-how-ukraine-has-outgunned-russia-sabotage
- https://www.dw.com/en/who-are-the-russian-volunteers-fighting-for-ukraine/a-65722771